I am rather behind on my SCOTUS writing, but one has to start digging out of a hole somewhere and it makes sense for me to begin by finally giving a writeup about the first decision in an argued case of the year, issued back on December 5. My thoughts on the oral argument for this case, which was held on October 4, can be found here.
This case involves the Americans with Disabilities Act, and its requirement that hotels make known their accessibility features to patrons. There are civil penalties for violating the act's requirements. In this case, an attorney filed suits across the country on behalf of his client (the Respondent in this case) alleging violations of the ADA accessibility notifications. In most instances this meant that the hotels he targetted had not posted the accessibility information on their website. For disabled patrons seeking to plan a trip, this makes it very difficult to know what hotels they could potentially stay at - the very issue the ADA sought to resolve. In virtually all instances, the hotels in questions chose to settle rather than fight the claim.
Eventually it became clear that the Respondent was filing these suits across the country, and it became apparent that she was not actually planning to travel to any of the hotels in question. Without concrete plans to actually stay in the hotels, the Respondent would not have suffered any actual injury - and suffering an injury is a requirement to be able to bring a suit in federal court. This fact was used to challenge the Respondent's standing in suits across at least 6 circuits - with an even 3/3 split on the question of whether she in fact had standing to sue. With the case in this posture, SCOTUS took the case to resolve the standing question.
Before the oral argument was held in early October, the lawyer that was working for the Respondent was sanctioned by his local bar for misconduct and his license to practice was suspended. The Respondent voluntarily affirmed that she would drop her pending suits and not bring further suits, meaning that the present case between Acheson and the Respondent no longer existed in fact as it had been independently dropped by the party who originally brought the suit. The Respondent then argued to SCOTUS that the case was now moot and therefore the case should be dismissed without resolving the standing question. The Petitioner, however, argued that it would be inappropriate to end the case without resolving the standing question because to do so would give a path for other petitioners in the states that had found that standing existed to continue filing nuisance suits against hotels confident in the knowledge that if a case was ever succesfully appealed to SCOTUS and certiorari was granted, they could just move to dismiss the case and avoid having the case reviewed by the Supreme Court, limiting their losses. As a result, the Petitioner asked the court to keep the case and resolve it despite the mootness issue.
In a short opinion authored by Justice Barrett and joined by everyone except for Thomas and Jackson, who both concurred in the judgment, the Court held that while it had the power to decide the mootness and standing questions in whatever order they wanted to (allowing them to decide the standing question first if they wished to), in this case it made more sense to decide mootness first and thus dismiss the case. Essentially, the Court indicated that it saw no reason to believe that the Respondent's affirmed decision not to file future cases of this type was anything but genuine, and as such it saw no reason to keep the case alive. In an acknowledgment that others could attempt to come along and manipulate the Court in the future with a similar scheme, however, the Court noted that it had the authority to decide the standing question if it wanted (and needed) to do so.
There were two concurrences in the judgment in this case. As a reminder, a concurrence in the judgment means that the judge (or judges) who issue or sign on to that opinion agree with the ultimate resolution that the Court made of the case (in this case, vacating the decision of the appeals court below and remanding the case to the original District Court that heard it so it could be dismissed), but disagreed with the reasoning used by the Court. The first of those concurrences in the judgment was issued by Justice Thomas. While he agrees that the case is moot, he would settle the standing question before getting to the mootness question. He would do so for three reasons: (1) standing is logically something that applies from the very beginning of the case, so it should logically be decided before a question of mootness, which arises later in the case; (2) the question in this case is capable of being repeated by this and other potential litigants but likely to continue evading review, since the incentives for hotels sued under this provision are to settle rather than spend the money to litigate; and (3) Justice Thomas thinks that the Respondent's behavior in this case suggests she is acting strategically in asking for the dismissal and so is abusing the Court's docket for her own gain.
Having decided that standing should be decided first, Thomas analyzes the standing question and finds that the Respondent lacks standing since she had no actual interest in visiting the hotel in this case, meaning she suffered no injury in fact. He distinguishes a case called Haven Realty in which black litigants were able to sue because they were told that there were no available houses when white individuals asking the same question were told there were. These litigants were also testing compliance with federal law, and the Court upheld their standing to sue - however, Justice Thomas distinguishes the cases because the Fair Housing Act provision the testers were relying on in that case specifically granted individuals a right to accurate information on the housing market. In this case, the Americans with Disabilities Act provision being relied on by the Respondent only guaranteed a right to be free from discrimination - not a right to information - and as a result, a "tester" with no intention to actually stay in the hotel would not be covered, in Thomas's reading.
The second concurrence in the judgment comes from Justice Jackson, and is based on an entirely different principle. Like the rest of the Court, Justice Jackson finds that the case is now moot. Her quibble is instead with how the Court decided to issue its order to vacate the lower court's judgment in this case. Justice Jackson begins with a short mootness analysis, but then states that the decision to issue a vacatur order is a separate question, and that it should not be handed out automatically. Indeed, she goes on to say that the power of the Court to grant a vacatur order stems originally from the the Court's equity powers, and that as such the Court should conduct an analysis of the interests associated with a decision to vacate the lower court order and balance the equities. While she has a number of compelling quotes in the argument that follows, the following quote pretty well summarizes the argument she is making in favor of leaving a lower court decision in pace even after a case becomes moot barring extraordinary circumstances justified by an equitable determination that it is the fair and just thing to do in the individual circumstances of a particular case:
The reason this is a concurrence in the judgment and not a dissent is that after carrying out the particularized analysis of the equitable factors in this case, Justice Jackson would rely on precedent to issue the vacatur order. This is primarily because the mootness in this case derived from the unilateral actions of the Respondent in withdrawing her suit, and the Court generally automatically issues a vacatur order in such a unilateral mootness case. Jackson wrote her opinion to state clearly that she disagrees with the court treating this like an automatic requirement and to point toward her favored approach to vacatur analysis. Given that no one else signed onto her opinion, she is - at least for now - on a rather lonely island with this issue.
When I analyzed the oral argument in this case, I stated pretty clearly that I thought the Justices were headed for this very result:
For once, my prediction in a case proved pretty spot on, so I'm taking this as a big win to start the year in SCOTUS opinion analysis. We'll see whether I can maintain that streak whenever the next case is released!
What do you think of this decision? Did the Justices get it right?
This case involves the Americans with Disabilities Act, and its requirement that hotels make known their accessibility features to patrons. There are civil penalties for violating the act's requirements. In this case, an attorney filed suits across the country on behalf of his client (the Respondent in this case) alleging violations of the ADA accessibility notifications. In most instances this meant that the hotels he targetted had not posted the accessibility information on their website. For disabled patrons seeking to plan a trip, this makes it very difficult to know what hotels they could potentially stay at - the very issue the ADA sought to resolve. In virtually all instances, the hotels in questions chose to settle rather than fight the claim.
Eventually it became clear that the Respondent was filing these suits across the country, and it became apparent that she was not actually planning to travel to any of the hotels in question. Without concrete plans to actually stay in the hotels, the Respondent would not have suffered any actual injury - and suffering an injury is a requirement to be able to bring a suit in federal court. This fact was used to challenge the Respondent's standing in suits across at least 6 circuits - with an even 3/3 split on the question of whether she in fact had standing to sue. With the case in this posture, SCOTUS took the case to resolve the standing question.
Before the oral argument was held in early October, the lawyer that was working for the Respondent was sanctioned by his local bar for misconduct and his license to practice was suspended. The Respondent voluntarily affirmed that she would drop her pending suits and not bring further suits, meaning that the present case between Acheson and the Respondent no longer existed in fact as it had been independently dropped by the party who originally brought the suit. The Respondent then argued to SCOTUS that the case was now moot and therefore the case should be dismissed without resolving the standing question. The Petitioner, however, argued that it would be inappropriate to end the case without resolving the standing question because to do so would give a path for other petitioners in the states that had found that standing existed to continue filing nuisance suits against hotels confident in the knowledge that if a case was ever succesfully appealed to SCOTUS and certiorari was granted, they could just move to dismiss the case and avoid having the case reviewed by the Supreme Court, limiting their losses. As a result, the Petitioner asked the court to keep the case and resolve it despite the mootness issue.
In a short opinion authored by Justice Barrett and joined by everyone except for Thomas and Jackson, who both concurred in the judgment, the Court held that while it had the power to decide the mootness and standing questions in whatever order they wanted to (allowing them to decide the standing question first if they wished to), in this case it made more sense to decide mootness first and thus dismiss the case. Essentially, the Court indicated that it saw no reason to believe that the Respondent's affirmed decision not to file future cases of this type was anything but genuine, and as such it saw no reason to keep the case alive. In an acknowledgment that others could attempt to come along and manipulate the Court in the future with a similar scheme, however, the Court noted that it had the authority to decide the standing question if it wanted (and needed) to do so.
There were two concurrences in the judgment in this case. As a reminder, a concurrence in the judgment means that the judge (or judges) who issue or sign on to that opinion agree with the ultimate resolution that the Court made of the case (in this case, vacating the decision of the appeals court below and remanding the case to the original District Court that heard it so it could be dismissed), but disagreed with the reasoning used by the Court. The first of those concurrences in the judgment was issued by Justice Thomas. While he agrees that the case is moot, he would settle the standing question before getting to the mootness question. He would do so for three reasons: (1) standing is logically something that applies from the very beginning of the case, so it should logically be decided before a question of mootness, which arises later in the case; (2) the question in this case is capable of being repeated by this and other potential litigants but likely to continue evading review, since the incentives for hotels sued under this provision are to settle rather than spend the money to litigate; and (3) Justice Thomas thinks that the Respondent's behavior in this case suggests she is acting strategically in asking for the dismissal and so is abusing the Court's docket for her own gain.
Having decided that standing should be decided first, Thomas analyzes the standing question and finds that the Respondent lacks standing since she had no actual interest in visiting the hotel in this case, meaning she suffered no injury in fact. He distinguishes a case called Haven Realty in which black litigants were able to sue because they were told that there were no available houses when white individuals asking the same question were told there were. These litigants were also testing compliance with federal law, and the Court upheld their standing to sue - however, Justice Thomas distinguishes the cases because the Fair Housing Act provision the testers were relying on in that case specifically granted individuals a right to accurate information on the housing market. In this case, the Americans with Disabilities Act provision being relied on by the Respondent only guaranteed a right to be free from discrimination - not a right to information - and as a result, a "tester" with no intention to actually stay in the hotel would not be covered, in Thomas's reading.
The second concurrence in the judgment comes from Justice Jackson, and is based on an entirely different principle. Like the rest of the Court, Justice Jackson finds that the case is now moot. Her quibble is instead with how the Court decided to issue its order to vacate the lower court's judgment in this case. Justice Jackson begins with a short mootness analysis, but then states that the decision to issue a vacatur order is a separate question, and that it should not be handed out automatically. Indeed, she goes on to say that the power of the Court to grant a vacatur order stems originally from the the Court's equity powers, and that as such the Court should conduct an analysis of the interests associated with a decision to vacate the lower court order and balance the equities. While she has a number of compelling quotes in the argument that follows, the following quote pretty well summarizes the argument she is making in favor of leaving a lower court decision in pace even after a case becomes moot barring extraordinary circumstances justified by an equitable determination that it is the fair and just thing to do in the individual circumstances of a particular case:
The reason this is a concurrence in the judgment and not a dissent is that after carrying out the particularized analysis of the equitable factors in this case, Justice Jackson would rely on precedent to issue the vacatur order. This is primarily because the mootness in this case derived from the unilateral actions of the Respondent in withdrawing her suit, and the Court generally automatically issues a vacatur order in such a unilateral mootness case. Jackson wrote her opinion to state clearly that she disagrees with the court treating this like an automatic requirement and to point toward her favored approach to vacatur analysis. Given that no one else signed onto her opinion, she is - at least for now - on a rather lonely island with this issue.
When I analyzed the oral argument in this case, I stated pretty clearly that I thought the Justices were headed for this very result:
For once, my prediction in a case proved pretty spot on, so I'm taking this as a big win to start the year in SCOTUS opinion analysis. We'll see whether I can maintain that streak whenever the next case is released!
What do you think of this decision? Did the Justices get it right?