Opinion: Let's Get Smart About Intelligence
Written by Speaker McEntire
You know, many people don't know that my NS name is actually inspired by Reba McEntire. As I was sitting down to pen this piece about what I've learned so far as Speaker of the Senate, this particular tweet from my namesake seemed rather appropriate. Of course, that's a bit of levity. The truth is, I have immensely enjoyed working with my colleagues, and I'm proud of what we've done together so far. But, through the term so far, one thing has become apparent: the Senate is a remarkably weak institution. For instance, I learned that there was no provision for the Senate to override a veto by the President.
Even moreso, I was shocked by the Senate's powers surrounding intelligence matters. The Senate is legally charged with confirming the Director of the Europeian Intelligence Agency (EIA), but is ill-equipped within its current legal powers to do so. For instance, after attempting to create a private Senate committee that would discuss intelligence matters, I was told that legally all business within the Senate forum had to be viewable by at least all Senators, Honored Citizens, President/VP, and Chancellors. In reconfirming the DEIA, I realized that we had no way of requesting information from the DEIA besides that which he willingly volunteered and was willing to declassify for us. Looking back through the reconfirmation thread, I also learned that I was the first Speaker to take NES up on his offer of a private briefing.
To be clear, NES was fully cooperative and provided a comprehensive explanation of everything that Senator Drexlore and I wanted to know. And the most recent reconfirmation was likely the most active that we've had in the region (although it's not a very high bar). There are glimmers of hope, but it is my firm belief that we have to be smarter about how we do intelligence in Europeia in order to fully restore public trust and avoid repeat incidents similar to the Trinnghazi scandal. One of the issues which caused that scandal to spiral out of control was the lack of reassurance for the public. If the Senate had been able to play its proper role in oversight, there could have been greater public understanding and less of an unresolved issue. To me, the proper role of oversight requires several changes.
We must shorten the term length of the DEIA. Right now, the Senate can only reconfirm the DEIA every 180 days. Theoretically, after a DEIA is confirmed, three general elections for Senate could occur before the next confirmation. In between those times, there are no questions asked of the DEIA, thus there is no ongoing monitoring. Effectively, this means that the confirmations are vanity exercises, because the Senate is not readily aware of the issues available. The term length of the DEIA means right that there is no ongoing consciousness of the EIA's activities by the body that is supposed to be confirming its director.
We must allow the Senate to subpoena classified information. For the Senate to effectively do its job, it cannot rely on whatever the DEIA is willing to tell us. Of course, it would be illegal for any Senator that saw classified information to release it in any way, but Senators should be able to ask questions and get answers. In the example of Trinnghazi, if the Senate were to launch an investigation, which many in the region wanted us to do, we would have had no power to investigate anything.
We must restore the balance of power between Executive and Legislative control of the EIA. The Senate subcommittee found that the EIA acted properly in the Trinnghazi scandal, and that blame did not lay with NES. However, a somewhat chilling thought follows logically from that event. What if, after acting improperly, a President threatened the DEIA with termination? The DEIA currently serves entirely at the pleasure of the President, it would be a completely legal thing to do. The DEIA would have no recourse, no one to report the President's improper actions to, and the region would be worse for it. The EIA does not operate at the direction of the President, and that independence should be recognized by the legal structure of accountability. The EIA is an independent institution, the Director of which serves at the pleasure of the President. However, the EIA should report jointly to both the President and the Senate. And while the President should be able to fire the DEIA, there must be some level of Senate oversight to prevent wrongdoing by the Executive.
I am reminded of a quote by HEM in a particularly poignant post on the Honored Citizens Restriction Amendment (emphasis mine):
Right now, our Senate does not meet the criteria outlined above, particularly in the area of intelligence. But that is not because of individual weakness of Senators, or we aren't doing our job. The fact is, the Senate as currently constituted is not equipped to fulfill its legal role in oversight of our intelligence agency. For many years, no one cared about this issue because nothing bad came of it. However, the Trinnghazi scandal shows the consequences of our reckless intelligence policy. We must take steps to make sure that proper accountability is in place, to both protect the Executive and EIA from scandal and to restore public trust in our intelligence institutions.
