- Pronouns
- He/Him
What if?: An outsider's look at the Incident at Pristina airport
January 13th 2018
By Olde Delaware
When I decided to write this article in December of last year I thought I would be doing it a lot differently. I had always heard about the incident at Pristina as Russian aggression, a way for Russia to maintain a small grasp of a former satellite state. I had sat down to write just this, how Russia was exploring ways to get back what it lost after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, how NATO and the U.S. were completely justified in their actions. But things just kept coming up that were chipping away at that bias I had and they all pointed to one result: That American, not Russian Aggression nearly brought us to the brink of World War III.
So first, lets look at exactly what the 'Incident at Pristina' was.
Initial Stages
Hours after NATO signed an agreement with Serbia, a column of about thirty Russian armoured vehicles carrying 250 Russian troops, who were part of the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia, moved into Serbia. At 10:30 a.m. this was confirmed by SHAPE and by pictures from CNN which showed that the Russians had hastily painted "KFOR" in white letters on their vehicles where they had previously been "SFOR". It was assumed that the column was heading for Pristina and Pristina International Airport ahead of the arrival of NATO troops.
In General Sir Mike Jackson's autobiography 'Soldier', The General alludes that this was done in an effort to make the operation in the former satellite country look less like a NATO operation and more like a joint one. The General believes that Russia made such a bold move because of their loss in the Cold War, that they wanted to be seen as an equal, a force to still be reckoned with and respected. After looking over some articles and the General's book, in my gut I believe he makes the right call here. Russia has acted as a protector and a strong ally in this region for so long they needed to be seen as an equal or on equal footing with the West here; While they assisted in brokering the deal with Serbia, they needed to back that up and show their allies that the Russian Military would still be able to offer that security and protection.
Strategic Importance
One of the arguments made by SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe) was that Pristina was an airfield of strategic importance. At the time, it was the only airfield in Kosovo able to handle both civilian and military aircraft. But, at the time NATO forces were utilizing bases in Greece and Macedonia. It controlled the airspace around Serbia and Kosovo and the field, which sits just 35 miles from the border was heavily damaged in initial bombings. One belief pushed forward by General Jackson is that Serbian MiG's, which were housed in reinforced bunkers at Pristina is one of the reasons why Russians broke for the airport as in to secure technology. But the West had had access to Russian made MiGs for years, using them in OPFOR training missions such as 'Mojave Viper' and 'Red Flag'.
15 Minute Alert
As a result of the Russian movements, General Sir Mike Jackson flew to Macedonia to meet with Secretary of State Madeline Albright. The Secretary, according to the General 'did not seem to appreciate the scope of what was happening'. This is the most concerning part to me, that U.S. civilian leadership didn't know the scope of the the risks involved in such a massive operation. Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov seemed to profess that he didn't know what was going on either, saying that the moves by the Russian Army were 'certainly not underhanded'.
Once Jackson returned to the front, General Clark's staff became insistent that the Airport be taken from the Russians before their arrival. France offered a battalion and 23 Puma Helicopters and Jackson placed 1 Para on 15 minute alert. But, there would be no close air support. 2 Battalions of ground troops against armored infantry would be an outright massacre. As the day wears on the the arrival time of the Russians is pushed back from 3pm to 6pm, strategy is now redrawn and a startling assessment becomes clear. American Force Command offers 6 Apache helicopters as support but no ground forces to assist the 2 battalions of French and British forces sent to the Airfield. The view of the multinational force on the ground is that Washington wants the operation to take place but not at the risk of American lives.
In response, France pulls their Battalion out and withdraws the offer which would leave 1 Para to hold its own, alone, against the Russians. That evening, General Clark informs KFOR the operation to seize the airport would be placed on hold. The decision to do so is welcomed by KFOR Command but such a decision should have been made on operational readiness before the wheels were put in motion. But also the reluctance to commit U.S. ground forces to this operation needs to be examined closer. Where did this order come from? Who made it and why? Was SACEUR willing to lay all of the potential blame on KFOR should the operation fail and does this damage the NATO chain of command?
Arrival at Pristina
NATO Command tried early on the morning of D-Day to push back H-Hour or the hour when NATO Forces would enter Serbia and Kosovo under the terms of the agreement. KFOR Command insisted that the time not be delayed and by delaying the entry would be seen as weak. NATO relented and H-Hour began on time at 05:00am. As the operation began, a Russian staff officer arrived to hand deliver a letter personally to General Sir Mike Jackson, the letter was addressed to Commander, KFOR. The Russians acknowledged his command and wished to make it clear that they were not opposed to the operation but wished to take part.
But still, General Clark and SACEUR Command insisted that KFOR make every effort to get to Pristina, to stop the Russians from "Creating facts on the ground" and to secure the airfield. KFOR detached 4 Armoured Brigade and 5 Airborne Brigade, which arrived that morning. What they found was not a ragtag group of Russians and light vehicles but a strong, heavily armored column of forces dug in at the Airport and led by a 2 Star General. General Viktor Zavarzin commanded the Russians and would later go on to become Chairman of the Defense Committee while elected to Russia's Duma met with General Jackson who flew to Pristina to meet with the General personally. According to General Jackson, the meeting went well.
But upon returning to the Command Post, all hell broke loose.
I won't start World War III for you sir
One thing I took away from reading the chapter of Jackson's book was that Clark was obsessed with Russia. That Clark firmly believed and in turn his staff firmly believed that Russia was there to invade, to occupy and to turn Serbs against NATO. Before I got my hands on the book I spent some time reading about General Clark. I had always believed him to be a fair and able field Commander but what I've learned is the polar opposite and his actions in Serbia may have led us closer to World War III than perhaps even the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Despite intelligence informing him that Russia was not breaking out of the airfield, Clark adamantly ordered helicopters landed on the runways at Pristina to keep the Russians from using the field. KFOR asked for U.S. support and initially, the Americans would not commit. Again, it seemed like Washington wanted others to die on the hill they sent them to. Hours later, American forces informed KFOR that they would reverse their decision and commit aircraft to blocking the runways but by that time weather intervened.
That evening, General Jackson spoke privately with General Clark, who continued to insist that Russia needed to be stopped despite all intelligence to the contrary. Jackson in his book says he offered to speak with the Russians, who at that time had been instrumental in dealing with the Serbs and impressed on General Clark that they needed to be treated as equals. General Clark however refused and then made a statement that literally threw me back in my chair. "These orders aren't coming from Washington, they are coming from me in my authority as SACEUR". Jackson himself says he questioned Clark's ability to make such an order before uttering the now famous phrase, that he would "not start World War III for you".
Clark, now incensed tells Jackson that he is giving him a direct order to block the runways and again, Jackson says he will not do it. Jackson now takes the phone and calls Charles Guthrie, Chief of the Imperial General Staff who in turn contacts Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who informs General Clark that they both agreed with the assessment of General Jackson. It seemed that Washington did want the runways blocked but not at the expense of a direct confrontation with the Russians. Even in spite of this, General Clark then acting as NATO Commander ordered Jackson to block the runways again, this time General Jackson offered the use of 4 Armoured Brigade which was standing by outside the Airfield. Knowing that by doing so, his Commanders in London would need to give express permission for this. London however did not authorize the use of 4 Armoured for this action and the crisis was over. Guthrie issued orders that the airfield would be isolated but it would not block the runways, that it would not enter the airfield.
The Crisis was over
The General Flipped at Dawn
One continuing theme in General Jackson's book is that the American contingent continued to believe non confirmed rumors of Russian transports flying large amounts of forces and vehicles to Serbia. General Clark believed it, his staff believed it. They believed every single rumor and ill informed news on Russia that they received which led to their paranoia of Russia and their intent. General Clark's almost militant view that Russia was here to invade or otherwise cause issues was a result of the American Cold War strategy never being updated or otherwise reworked and in turn this led to embarrassing and downright dangerous actions by U.S. Forces in KFOR. General Clark's actions over those two days would have damaging consequences for him personally as he was replaced as SACEUR Commander earlier than expected.
When Clark ran for President in 2004, Hugh Shelton who was Clark's Boss during KFOR said famously that "Clark's 'short tour' as SACEUR was due to character and integrity issues and adding that 'Wes wouldn't get my vote'" doomed the candidate before he even left the starting gate. There were other damning clips of the candidate that would doom his campaign such as his comment that had "someone picked up the phone, he would be a Republican right now."
Overall Assessment
As I said in my intro, I came into this article with an inherent bias from only reading one side of the argument. I am old enough to remember Kosovo and Serbia, the bombings and the pictures on TV but I never really explored the nitty gritty of the conflict. One thing that just keeps gnawing at me is the reluctance of U.S. Forces to get involved in anything. We saw this in Rwanda where Richard A. Clarke (no relation) stood firm as he announced US Forces would not join the UN Peacekeepers in Rwanda, voted actively to reduce their numbers and refused any plan which countered the U.S.'s 'safe haven' plan.
General Clark was more than willing to send British, French and Norwegian forces to Pristina to fight the Russians and presumably die doing so to save American face. If not for the concerted effort of the British, he may have succeeded. Some may argue that by allowing Russia to usurp KFOR Command and deploy its own forces independently, that this gave Russia confidence enough to start wars in Georgia and Ukraine. Perhaps there is some truth to that, but after researching and reading about the Incident at Pristina its that if anyone gave Russia that confidence to be aggressive, it was the United States and for that we can blame no one but ourselves.
January 13th 2018
By Olde Delaware
When I decided to write this article in December of last year I thought I would be doing it a lot differently. I had always heard about the incident at Pristina as Russian aggression, a way for Russia to maintain a small grasp of a former satellite state. I had sat down to write just this, how Russia was exploring ways to get back what it lost after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, how NATO and the U.S. were completely justified in their actions. But things just kept coming up that were chipping away at that bias I had and they all pointed to one result: That American, not Russian Aggression nearly brought us to the brink of World War III.
So first, lets look at exactly what the 'Incident at Pristina' was.
Initial Stages
Hours after NATO signed an agreement with Serbia, a column of about thirty Russian armoured vehicles carrying 250 Russian troops, who were part of the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia, moved into Serbia. At 10:30 a.m. this was confirmed by SHAPE and by pictures from CNN which showed that the Russians had hastily painted "KFOR" in white letters on their vehicles where they had previously been "SFOR". It was assumed that the column was heading for Pristina and Pristina International Airport ahead of the arrival of NATO troops.
In General Sir Mike Jackson's autobiography 'Soldier', The General alludes that this was done in an effort to make the operation in the former satellite country look less like a NATO operation and more like a joint one. The General believes that Russia made such a bold move because of their loss in the Cold War, that they wanted to be seen as an equal, a force to still be reckoned with and respected. After looking over some articles and the General's book, in my gut I believe he makes the right call here. Russia has acted as a protector and a strong ally in this region for so long they needed to be seen as an equal or on equal footing with the West here; While they assisted in brokering the deal with Serbia, they needed to back that up and show their allies that the Russian Military would still be able to offer that security and protection.
Strategic Importance
One of the arguments made by SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe) was that Pristina was an airfield of strategic importance. At the time, it was the only airfield in Kosovo able to handle both civilian and military aircraft. But, at the time NATO forces were utilizing bases in Greece and Macedonia. It controlled the airspace around Serbia and Kosovo and the field, which sits just 35 miles from the border was heavily damaged in initial bombings. One belief pushed forward by General Jackson is that Serbian MiG's, which were housed in reinforced bunkers at Pristina is one of the reasons why Russians broke for the airport as in to secure technology. But the West had had access to Russian made MiGs for years, using them in OPFOR training missions such as 'Mojave Viper' and 'Red Flag'.
15 Minute Alert
As a result of the Russian movements, General Sir Mike Jackson flew to Macedonia to meet with Secretary of State Madeline Albright. The Secretary, according to the General 'did not seem to appreciate the scope of what was happening'. This is the most concerning part to me, that U.S. civilian leadership didn't know the scope of the the risks involved in such a massive operation. Russian Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov seemed to profess that he didn't know what was going on either, saying that the moves by the Russian Army were 'certainly not underhanded'.
Once Jackson returned to the front, General Clark's staff became insistent that the Airport be taken from the Russians before their arrival. France offered a battalion and 23 Puma Helicopters and Jackson placed 1 Para on 15 minute alert. But, there would be no close air support. 2 Battalions of ground troops against armored infantry would be an outright massacre. As the day wears on the the arrival time of the Russians is pushed back from 3pm to 6pm, strategy is now redrawn and a startling assessment becomes clear. American Force Command offers 6 Apache helicopters as support but no ground forces to assist the 2 battalions of French and British forces sent to the Airfield. The view of the multinational force on the ground is that Washington wants the operation to take place but not at the risk of American lives.
In response, France pulls their Battalion out and withdraws the offer which would leave 1 Para to hold its own, alone, against the Russians. That evening, General Clark informs KFOR the operation to seize the airport would be placed on hold. The decision to do so is welcomed by KFOR Command but such a decision should have been made on operational readiness before the wheels were put in motion. But also the reluctance to commit U.S. ground forces to this operation needs to be examined closer. Where did this order come from? Who made it and why? Was SACEUR willing to lay all of the potential blame on KFOR should the operation fail and does this damage the NATO chain of command?
Arrival at Pristina
NATO Command tried early on the morning of D-Day to push back H-Hour or the hour when NATO Forces would enter Serbia and Kosovo under the terms of the agreement. KFOR Command insisted that the time not be delayed and by delaying the entry would be seen as weak. NATO relented and H-Hour began on time at 05:00am. As the operation began, a Russian staff officer arrived to hand deliver a letter personally to General Sir Mike Jackson, the letter was addressed to Commander, KFOR. The Russians acknowledged his command and wished to make it clear that they were not opposed to the operation but wished to take part.
But still, General Clark and SACEUR Command insisted that KFOR make every effort to get to Pristina, to stop the Russians from "Creating facts on the ground" and to secure the airfield. KFOR detached 4 Armoured Brigade and 5 Airborne Brigade, which arrived that morning. What they found was not a ragtag group of Russians and light vehicles but a strong, heavily armored column of forces dug in at the Airport and led by a 2 Star General. General Viktor Zavarzin commanded the Russians and would later go on to become Chairman of the Defense Committee while elected to Russia's Duma met with General Jackson who flew to Pristina to meet with the General personally. According to General Jackson, the meeting went well.
But upon returning to the Command Post, all hell broke loose.
I won't start World War III for you sir
One thing I took away from reading the chapter of Jackson's book was that Clark was obsessed with Russia. That Clark firmly believed and in turn his staff firmly believed that Russia was there to invade, to occupy and to turn Serbs against NATO. Before I got my hands on the book I spent some time reading about General Clark. I had always believed him to be a fair and able field Commander but what I've learned is the polar opposite and his actions in Serbia may have led us closer to World War III than perhaps even the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Despite intelligence informing him that Russia was not breaking out of the airfield, Clark adamantly ordered helicopters landed on the runways at Pristina to keep the Russians from using the field. KFOR asked for U.S. support and initially, the Americans would not commit. Again, it seemed like Washington wanted others to die on the hill they sent them to. Hours later, American forces informed KFOR that they would reverse their decision and commit aircraft to blocking the runways but by that time weather intervened.
That evening, General Jackson spoke privately with General Clark, who continued to insist that Russia needed to be stopped despite all intelligence to the contrary. Jackson in his book says he offered to speak with the Russians, who at that time had been instrumental in dealing with the Serbs and impressed on General Clark that they needed to be treated as equals. General Clark however refused and then made a statement that literally threw me back in my chair. "These orders aren't coming from Washington, they are coming from me in my authority as SACEUR". Jackson himself says he questioned Clark's ability to make such an order before uttering the now famous phrase, that he would "not start World War III for you".
Clark, now incensed tells Jackson that he is giving him a direct order to block the runways and again, Jackson says he will not do it. Jackson now takes the phone and calls Charles Guthrie, Chief of the Imperial General Staff who in turn contacts Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who informs General Clark that they both agreed with the assessment of General Jackson. It seemed that Washington did want the runways blocked but not at the expense of a direct confrontation with the Russians. Even in spite of this, General Clark then acting as NATO Commander ordered Jackson to block the runways again, this time General Jackson offered the use of 4 Armoured Brigade which was standing by outside the Airfield. Knowing that by doing so, his Commanders in London would need to give express permission for this. London however did not authorize the use of 4 Armoured for this action and the crisis was over. Guthrie issued orders that the airfield would be isolated but it would not block the runways, that it would not enter the airfield.
The Crisis was over
The General Flipped at Dawn
One continuing theme in General Jackson's book is that the American contingent continued to believe non confirmed rumors of Russian transports flying large amounts of forces and vehicles to Serbia. General Clark believed it, his staff believed it. They believed every single rumor and ill informed news on Russia that they received which led to their paranoia of Russia and their intent. General Clark's almost militant view that Russia was here to invade or otherwise cause issues was a result of the American Cold War strategy never being updated or otherwise reworked and in turn this led to embarrassing and downright dangerous actions by U.S. Forces in KFOR. General Clark's actions over those two days would have damaging consequences for him personally as he was replaced as SACEUR Commander earlier than expected.
When Clark ran for President in 2004, Hugh Shelton who was Clark's Boss during KFOR said famously that "Clark's 'short tour' as SACEUR was due to character and integrity issues and adding that 'Wes wouldn't get my vote'" doomed the candidate before he even left the starting gate. There were other damning clips of the candidate that would doom his campaign such as his comment that had "someone picked up the phone, he would be a Republican right now."
Overall Assessment
As I said in my intro, I came into this article with an inherent bias from only reading one side of the argument. I am old enough to remember Kosovo and Serbia, the bombings and the pictures on TV but I never really explored the nitty gritty of the conflict. One thing that just keeps gnawing at me is the reluctance of U.S. Forces to get involved in anything. We saw this in Rwanda where Richard A. Clarke (no relation) stood firm as he announced US Forces would not join the UN Peacekeepers in Rwanda, voted actively to reduce their numbers and refused any plan which countered the U.S.'s 'safe haven' plan.
General Clark was more than willing to send British, French and Norwegian forces to Pristina to fight the Russians and presumably die doing so to save American face. If not for the concerted effort of the British, he may have succeeded. Some may argue that by allowing Russia to usurp KFOR Command and deploy its own forces independently, that this gave Russia confidence enough to start wars in Georgia and Ukraine. Perhaps there is some truth to that, but after researching and reading about the Incident at Pristina its that if anyone gave Russia that confidence to be aggressive, it was the United States and for that we can blame no one but ourselves.
