The Supreme Court held its second to last argument day of the February Sitting today, and as is wont to happen this time of year, an opinion was released as well. While it is possible that another opinion could be released tomorrow when the Court sits to finish out February arguments, it's somewhat unlikely and so this probably rounds out the set of opinions we will see before the second half of March.
Neutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 17-1094 (9th Circuit Court of Appeals)
MAJ: Sotomayor (Unanimous)
This case is from the family of regulatory and statutory interpretation cases that make up the bulk of the Court's work but that just don't get that much attention - largely for good reason. Rather than turning on grand Constitutional principles, this case turns on the interpretation of a modest Rule of Civil Procedure. It's not especially surprising that this one didn't exactly earn a lot of media attention today.
Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that in the wake of a decision by a federal district court to either grant or deny certification of a class in a class action, a party who wishes to challenge the ruling immediately (as opposed to waiting for further judifical action on the case and appealing upon its completion) must request permission from the appropriate appellate court within 14 days of the after the class certification order is issued.
In this case, Mr. Lambert was seeking to sue Neutraceutical on behalf of himself and others who were similarly situated and believed that Neutraceutical had violated California consumer protection law. After initially agreeing to certify a class, the district court in his case ended up turning around and rejected the class certification. Under Rule 23(f), Lambert should have gone directly to the appellate court and sought an immediate appeal of the class certification denial, but instead he notified the district court of an intention to seek relief. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the class certification denial in the district court on the 14th and final day available for the appeal. It would not be until four months later that he would ask permission from the appeals court to file an appeal, after the motion for reconsideration had also been denied.
Surprisingly, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to allow the appeal despite acknowledging that it was clearly filed out of time. The court reasoned that Lambert had notified the district court of an intention to appeal, had complied with the deadlines set by the district court for filing a motion for reconsideration of the ruling, and had then filed for an appeal within 14 days after the motion for reconsidered was ultimately denied. All of this showed that Lambert was being diligent in pursuing his claim, and therefore the equitable thing to do was to toll the filing period during the pendency of the reconsideration motion.
The Supreme Court first determined that the 9th Circuit was correct in deciding that the timeliness rule was non-jurisdictional in nature. This is significant bercause jurisdictional rules provide an absolute bar to a court - if a rule is implicated that removes the court's jurisdiction from a case, that court is simply powerless to do anything with the case. However, the Rules of Civil Procedure are "claims processing" rules that are found in a set of Procedural Rules rather than in a specific statute, and as such they are non-jurisdictional in nature. With a non-jurisdictional rule, the protections afforded by timely filing provisions can be waived or forfeited if a party is not diligent in raising them with the court, as the court generally will not do so on its own. Here, however, the other party raised the timely filing issue with the 9th Circuit, meaning it was neither waived nor forfeited.
Given this context, the Supreme Court easily dismissed the 9th Circuit's ruling allowing the appeal to move forward as if the timely filing period had been "tolled." Whether it would be good practice to offer such a tolling period isn't really the issue - the plain language of the rule in question states that there are 14 days to file an appeal. Whether there is also a motion to reconsider the underlying ruling at the district court level isn't part of the question, and nor is diligence in pursuing that claim. Further, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which generally presume the ability of an appellate court to suspend rules - including timelines - for good cause (including reasons of equity) also include a specific provision in Rule 26(b)(1) stating that "a court of appeals may not extend the time to file ... a petition for permission to appeal." The plain language of 23(f) of the Civil Rules and 26(b)(1) of the Appellate Rules make abundantly clear that the timely filing period means just what it says.
While I tend to think complaints about the 9th Circuit are generally misplaced, there's no question that between the "zombie judge" case yesterday and this case today, the 9th Circuit missed the mark badly with some basic jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was entirely correct to send this back for the court to handle appropriately.
Neutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 17-1094 (9th Circuit Court of Appeals)
MAJ: Sotomayor (Unanimous)
This case is from the family of regulatory and statutory interpretation cases that make up the bulk of the Court's work but that just don't get that much attention - largely for good reason. Rather than turning on grand Constitutional principles, this case turns on the interpretation of a modest Rule of Civil Procedure. It's not especially surprising that this one didn't exactly earn a lot of media attention today.
Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that in the wake of a decision by a federal district court to either grant or deny certification of a class in a class action, a party who wishes to challenge the ruling immediately (as opposed to waiting for further judifical action on the case and appealing upon its completion) must request permission from the appropriate appellate court within 14 days of the after the class certification order is issued.
In this case, Mr. Lambert was seeking to sue Neutraceutical on behalf of himself and others who were similarly situated and believed that Neutraceutical had violated California consumer protection law. After initially agreeing to certify a class, the district court in his case ended up turning around and rejected the class certification. Under Rule 23(f), Lambert should have gone directly to the appellate court and sought an immediate appeal of the class certification denial, but instead he notified the district court of an intention to seek relief. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the class certification denial in the district court on the 14th and final day available for the appeal. It would not be until four months later that he would ask permission from the appeals court to file an appeal, after the motion for reconsideration had also been denied.
Surprisingly, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided to allow the appeal despite acknowledging that it was clearly filed out of time. The court reasoned that Lambert had notified the district court of an intention to appeal, had complied with the deadlines set by the district court for filing a motion for reconsideration of the ruling, and had then filed for an appeal within 14 days after the motion for reconsidered was ultimately denied. All of this showed that Lambert was being diligent in pursuing his claim, and therefore the equitable thing to do was to toll the filing period during the pendency of the reconsideration motion.
The Supreme Court first determined that the 9th Circuit was correct in deciding that the timeliness rule was non-jurisdictional in nature. This is significant bercause jurisdictional rules provide an absolute bar to a court - if a rule is implicated that removes the court's jurisdiction from a case, that court is simply powerless to do anything with the case. However, the Rules of Civil Procedure are "claims processing" rules that are found in a set of Procedural Rules rather than in a specific statute, and as such they are non-jurisdictional in nature. With a non-jurisdictional rule, the protections afforded by timely filing provisions can be waived or forfeited if a party is not diligent in raising them with the court, as the court generally will not do so on its own. Here, however, the other party raised the timely filing issue with the 9th Circuit, meaning it was neither waived nor forfeited.
Given this context, the Supreme Court easily dismissed the 9th Circuit's ruling allowing the appeal to move forward as if the timely filing period had been "tolled." Whether it would be good practice to offer such a tolling period isn't really the issue - the plain language of the rule in question states that there are 14 days to file an appeal. Whether there is also a motion to reconsider the underlying ruling at the district court level isn't part of the question, and nor is diligence in pursuing that claim. Further, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which generally presume the ability of an appellate court to suspend rules - including timelines - for good cause (including reasons of equity) also include a specific provision in Rule 26(b)(1) stating that "a court of appeals may not extend the time to file ... a petition for permission to appeal." The plain language of 23(f) of the Civil Rules and 26(b)(1) of the Appellate Rules make abundantly clear that the timely filing period means just what it says.
While I tend to think complaints about the 9th Circuit are generally misplaced, there's no question that between the "zombie judge" case yesterday and this case today, the 9th Circuit missed the mark badly with some basic jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was entirely correct to send this back for the court to handle appropriately.
