In Defense of An Alternative to the Merge of the Europeian Executive Government
An Opinion Editorial
Written by Unmighty Hezekon
Thanks to Istillian and especially Astrellan for hunting down links
There is and has been much fervor over the topic of a reunification of the executive branches here in Europeia. In at least two locations, this fervid discussion has travelled many roads and split into many deviations. There have been partial solutions suggested and weaknesses borne out, and it seems that all is done, generally, with the intention of improving this region by focusing on the structure of our leading executive branches. Though this structure was split just over a year ago, there seems to be a strong movement to join the two offices of the executive back into a single group, with the arguments in favor claiming that doing so will create a more central and powerful authority which can and should hold acclaim and blame equally. I suggest there is an alternative route to solve the issues that we have currently - namely, that our executive is too divided, and there is no clear indication who is to be held accountable for issues that arise within and without our region; a lack of clear indication which offices are accountable to whom; and a lack of interest in the foreign affairs (hereon FA) aspect of our region. The idea is that this system does so without creating new issues mentioned in Senate and Grand Hall threads - an unnecessary workload strain on the executive leadership, and an inability to find suitable individuals to lead respective Cabinet- and Council-like organizations (the "staffing issue"). I do this with intent to present an alternative, something for the audience to consider, and note my views are subject to error.
To begin this slightly frightening and massive task, let's go over how our executive government is currently structured, as it is a marker of our current issue of confusion from people both in the region and outside. At the top level, ostensibly branded equals (although some have suggested that one is more prestigious than the other), are the positions of First Minister (FM) and Chief of State (CoS), the former of which is directly elected, and the latter of which was (up until recently) selected with plurality by the Senate. The FM is charged with managing the domestic affairs (DA) of the region, and the CoS with the FA, but both work in tandem. Each of them, in turn, employ others to help lead various aspects of their purview. Both the FM and the CoS run with an additional individual who acts as their second-in-command. The FM has a Second Minister (SM), and the CoS has a Vice Chief of State (VCoS), each of which acts as a supporting figure, as well as serving on their Cabinet or Council, respectively. The FM employs various ministers into their Cabinet, with each minister generally leading a ministry in a specialized area; e.g., a Ministry of Culture for planning social events and cultivating an inclusive cultural atmosphere. In turn, the CoS employs various councilors into their Council, again, with each councilor generally leading a council in a specific area; e.g., a Council of World Assembly Affairs, which is tasked with, as one would guess, affairs dealing with the NationStates (NS) World Assembly. There also can be Ministers/Councilors Without Portfolio, who are still members of the Cabinet and Council, respectively, but who do not lead a ministry or council. Instead, they act as general advisors and assistants. All of these appointments are subject to confirmation by the Senate. Moving downward, each minister and councilor may employ deputies as they please, and below that the ministries have their own assistant or junior ministers, and the councils have their assistant or junior councilors. These latter are general staff that make up each organization, and are necessary for fair production in their respective group.
Perhaps one of the main critiques is that this current structure, without lengthy explanation, is very confusing and difficult to understand for both people within and without the region. It has been mentioned that foreign governments have been confused with our structure, not sure with whom to speak or to approach regarding international matters; indeed, apparently there was an instance where there was almost a degradation of relations because of this confusion. Another example of this confusion of structure is the position of the Attorney General (AG): this position is appointed by both the CoS and the FM, and so serves them both. Who, precisely, is the AG to listen to if a disagreement arises between them? Can the AG act on their own grounding in such an instance? It stands unclear.
Another heavy critique is that this structure is problematic for ultimately placing responsibility. The interplay between FM and CoS is more complicated than simply "control the DA, control the FA," apparently, and actions which are taken by domestic offices can impact, either positively or negatively, the foreign office and its relationship with interregional affairs. (The converse, with the foreign office impacting domestic, is most obviously seen with treaties dictating actions the domestic ought take with regards to its interactions to the wider NS world.) It is the separation between the group of people which enacts something and the group of people which consequently takes on responsibility for it that causes inefficiencies in our current structure.
The final issue with our structure, or rather, our policy toward it, is that it seems to beget disinterest in or intimidation for a FA position. In the last year or so, there have only been two contested elections for the CoS, and the last was our most recent one that resulted in a close race. Even more, the two candidates were both very experienced in FA and in leading the region as a whole. There have been arguments put forth that assert it was our past selection method for this office, through the use of Senate electors rather than a public vote, that has resulted in the greater populace worrying either that they are not fit to the task of FA or that doing so requires a large hurdle to get over. This previous selection method is likely some part of it, but there are nonstructural reasons that affect these decisions as well. The general populace would likely prefer a direct election method for this position; but due to the nature of both the Senate's direction on the merge as well as this article's aim, it seems highly unlikely that a separate election for such a position will exist in the future of this region, even though the Senate did change this selection method recently, a change which may have, in fact, influenced the degree of competitiveness in this most recent CoS race.
A point of note is that of "executive bloat." This phrase is used to describe the overappointment of people to offices in our current structure, with the negative connotation attached to it implying the number ought be reduced. Whether this is true, and that failing to do so results in "diminished quality" of the titles and offices held, is something the article will address further. Currently, our system "suffers" from this malady, and there are valiant efforts to remove this scab from our system with the curiously unpopular implementation of a "hard cap."
These are the issues that seem present in our current system. To combat them, there is a hard push from parts of the Senate toward a re-unified executive, with a head office and a deputy office, the latter serving in conjunction but also subjunction to the former. These offices are in this article termed, respectively, as President (Pres) and Prime Minister (PM), one of which would be roughly the proposed "modernized" versions of the CoS, and the other of the FM. The most recent version of this structure, as of this article's publication, is that the Pres and PM would run on a unified ticket, with the Pres and PM doling out between them duties that relate to either DA or FA, and that the Pres stands as the chief officer of the region, with all trappings and burdens of it. There is currently underway a discussion as to the precise setup of the descendent offices and whether these offices are constitutionally capped at a given number (again, as of this article's publication), but for this article, let us consider them to be identical to the current structure, with the two changes being that the ministers and councilors are decided jointly by the Pres and PM, or at the very least agreed-upon; and that the PM does not have a deputy, being itself a deputy of the Pres. This is the structure, I think, that will cause more damage than not.
But first, does this proposed structure solve the issues it claims to fix? In terms of being confusing, I would hardly say so. It is, by nature of being a unit force, very simple. In this respect, it gets aces - one could hardly think of a simpler model, outside of putting the Pres in charge of the whole region (which is ridiculous).
With respect to ease of placement of acclaim and blame, this structure also receives great awards. As the Pres is the highest office, it receives the ultimate authority, and therefore any issues that occur, especially with respect to interregional affairs, must be assigned to it. Therefore, that is the office that must face the consequences of its deputies and ministers and councilors. Again, this receives good marks.
What about its impact on the nature of interest in FA? There has been some argumentation that there is a lack of interest in FA also due to the lack of a "stepping stone" arrangement to the CoS - that there is no great incentive for pursuing the office. While I think such line of reasoning is, frankly, inapplicable to our current structure (one could argue that the current deputy of the CoS acts as a "stepping stone"), one could argue that in this unified structure, there is indeed a "stepping stone" to the Pres, in the form of the PM. And while I believe this "stepping stone" argument is coarse and missing the point, it can be seen how this sort of structure would improve that aspect. Granted, having such a structure does not necessarily improve any given person's inherent interest (or lack thereof) in FA.
(A note: the point of considering DA as a "stepping stone" position to FA undercounts the idea that perhaps there are not many that care to focus on FA, and find the highest office in the region as being that which governs the domestic. There is equal praiseworthiness in being able to run a domestic effectively, as there is in securing foreign relations; and to suggest that governing FA is in some way superior to governing DA is, in my opinion, very crass. Moving forward, the dialogue should be over how to do both effectively, without the inherent bias toward interregional relations being the "prize position," and DA as "stepping stone.")
Here, however, is where the suggested structure begins to show its foundational weakness. Here is where we see the natural "burst point" of the struggle both to maintain high expectations of the executive office, and also to reduce the number of offices present to combat the notion of "executive bloat." In this suggested structure, in much the same way as the structure pre-Executive Split, there is an incredible pressure upon the office of the (then so-named) President. Such could be the pressure that to continue organizing the region as well as participate in it would cause burnout, something that is not unknown in our region even still. Without some method to waylay some of that pressure, it is likely that the high office of either the Pres or the PM could see a higher level of burnout than we currently do. And that does not seem in keeping with the spirit of the "modernization" process, which aims to reinvigorate interest in FA, in general. If an office has a reputation for causing burnout, it is unclear how such an office would garner such competitiveness for its elections. In this case, this structure earns poor scores.
Finally, with respect to its ability to allot proper resource management - which in this case means suitable individuals to serve subordinate offices - the austere vision in which this structure is produced disallows the proper filling of offices effectively. I repeat the previous point of reducing the number of offices needed in the overall structure, a point that naturally sees its way through to the ground floors of our government. If we are to have a set number of designated offices attempting to wrangle the entirety of the expectations of the region, that naturally increases the workload upon the offices. One could imagine the FA Councils suddenly expected to take on their current jobs while also now needing to focus on the domestic counterparts. In the above paragraph, we considered one burst point being burnout, a result no one is looking to increase. In this, we consider the other direction - that the number of offices, against the austere intent of the structure, must increase to avoid overburdening. At such a point, it seems like one of the main talking points of the austerity measure is become moot, by nature of needing to bend to deal with this pressure. It is here one would begin to wonder, "why not another way?"
Now, to get onto the real grit of the piece. The structure proposed here is thus: We continue to have the FM and CoS distinction, perhaps with different names, but that's not the issue. The FM-like position will continue to focus on the domestic, and the CoS on the foreign. I would argue that they are elected together, to serve as equals over their respective areas. As currently, each would be allowed to pick a deputy, to help them manage affairs. A difference here, one imagines, is that the nature of when these deputies would be picked (if picked at all) would depend upon whether the FM and CoS are elected jointly or separately; one would imagine a jointly-elected CoS and FM would likely not announce on their ticket who their deputy would be, or at the least not be expected to, as the main focus would be on the dynamic of the two on the ticket, in much a similar way as one would consider the Council or Cabinet a candidate offers when they stand. Regardless, each of the pair, again, would pick their respective Cabinet and Council, and these ministers and councilors would be confirmed by the Senate. On down, the structure remains the same as it currently is.
What are the benefits of this structure? Let us see how they measure up against our criteria.
With respect to there being confusion as to who reports to whom, I fully admit that this structure is not as clear as the one being considered in the Senate. Again, as is currently, we have a split FA/DA, with ministers and councilors reporting (respectively) to their PM and Pres, and there would seem to be perhaps a confusion as to who reports to whom. But this is not as big a confusion as it is being made to seem. If it is clear who lies in the ministries, and who lies in the councils, and each reports to their superior, you have a clear delineation. Now, does this mean that a minister is not subject to a Pres, or a councilor to a PM? The essence of this chain of command may have to be better argued by a group, and not a single individual; but I think even with there being an employment mismatch, that, at the top level, with the two equal partners working together, what is expected of either branch by the other be implemented via their respective leader, with issues arising heading to them. It is likely this falters when it comes to the example of a festival held by a ministry for an international audience, wherein the Pres might get the benefit of the event; but that might simply be the failing of this structure, inherently. This, I would argue, is not as important as other facets.
On that point, I turn to the merit of having a clear chain of acclaim and blame. This structure, again, is more complex, and produces a bit of mismatch with regards to its consequential impact on the co-leaders. It might be that people who do not deserve blame are given it, and that credit may likewise be handed to someone not directly involved. And on this point I may not have a good recourse or defense. This point and the last are perhaps my two weakest, and while I am not happy with this, I am much more comfortable producing this than weakness in other areas.
What about its impact on interest in FA? On this point, I think this structure would allow the implementation of the new democratic election process of the CoS, but put forth in regards to the Pres. This would allow those who are interested in working with a more FA focus to go toward this position with, I believe, lesser fear of being selected by a group of Senators, but rather by the public at large, as is done with the current FM (and now with the CoS). Yes, there would be expected scrutiny of candidates, but now the aim is not to appeal to a select group, but to the region at large, and to have the region answer with its voice on where priorities should lie. In this case, it is this compromising structure that fully allows our newly-minted election process to show its effects. This does this without requiring that every citizen interested in higher elected office to be so focused on FA if that is not what they wish to do, and likewise, for those who do not so wish to focus on DA, they are not required to, either. For those who consider the "stepping stone" argument important, this structure provides this "step" in both FA and DA, each with its own track. In this respect, I'll give it passing marks, and withhold awarding it overt aces.
And does it solve the "burst point" issues presented above? Take the first point, of potential burnout. Essentially, in terms of offices held, the number stays around the same, subject to changes potentially enacted by the Senate. At the topmost level, you have two individuals that, of course, must work together, but they are able to focus on their respective area, and if they find their job particularly burdensome, they have their seconds, the Coprime Minister (a math joke) and Vice President, to help pick up the slack. I think this, significantly, would help alleviate any potential buildup of pressure on the individuals at the helm, and significantly increase the number of people who would take interest in the roles. After all, if our goal is to promote competitive elections, it doesn't serve us to make the positions sought after incredibly stressful and alienating.
And, to continue, this structure does require that the number of offices stays roughly the same, and therefore there is no room for any austerity measure. This, I admit, is another point where perhaps the idea of "reduce and simplify" doesn't work. It is the author's opinion that "executive bloat" is a phrase that has little backing behind it, nor is it anything of serious concern at the time being - this being especially true after the great increase in nations that have been added to the region. However, admitting that one can be grossly misinformed and that times may change, if there were to be such an issue of "executive bloat," I feel this structure doesn't suffer from it. The whole point of there being as many offices as there are is in order to produce the effects expected of the executive - given what Senator Darcness has said in the Senate thread, the options under this new structure are either to reduce both the expectations of the executive and the number of offices, or to do nothing to both. "Something's gotta give," to put it plainly.
Alright, here we are, at the end of this great wall of text. A veritable political treatise in the form of an op-ed. The suggestions laid out by me, a suggestion for a semi-unified executive governmental structure, provides the necessities for governance without introducing, in my opinion, the issues that the current structure the Senate seems headed toward would produce. It offers a space wherein those may serve where they feel most interested, in a structure more unified than what is current, and that allows for a greater audience to participate in higher office. What is hoped is that, while this exact structure may not be implemented (hell, you could consider a President and VP who commands a Domestic Minister and Foreign Minister), those with the power to determine the direction this region heads consider alternatives to a single, unified executive with an unfavorable restriction on the number of offices. There can be made the argument that what is needed is greater oversight and constitutionally-mandated structure - but to what degree must this be formulated? Which points must be stressed? What is asked here is to consider, and to think.
So it has been written.
