A Taste of Skizz #21

”We all become a well-disguised mirror image of anything that we fight too long or too directly. That which we oppose determines the energy and frames the questions after a while. You lose all your inner freedom.” – Richard Rohr, O.F.M.

In the past few weeks, and especially during our recently concluded elections, there has been considerable debate about whether Europeia ought to declare war on the Greater German Reich, as several of our allies have already done. I have avoided publicly expressing an opinion until now, partly because I was conflicted myself about what we should do. Although I respect the decisions by our allies who have declared war and the opinions of citizens here who believe we should do likewise, I have come to the conclusion that Europeia should not declare war on the GGR.

To be sure, Nazi-themed regions and those who associate with them are no friends of ours. We have long taken a hard line against working with Nazis, or with working with those who align themselves with Nazis. This uncompromising stance was not always popular abroad, but we rightly viewed it as a non-negotiable expression of our values. Recently, we have intensified that stance by offering key support for the liberation of a Nazi-occupied region, by leading offensive military action against a prominent Nazi region, and by tightening our citizenship procedures in an effort to ferret out Nazi sympathizers who might seek quarter here. Some regions at “war” with GGR have not taken a similarly strong stance.

There are a number of tactical reasons to avoid a war with the GGR:

-- The GGR is a weak (but foundered) region, with just 2 nations, that recently had its offsite forum deleted by its service provider. It is not clear that we have the capability to weaken GGR any further. Put another way, it is not clear that a war on GGR would have an achievable objective. It is a mistake to enter any war – especially a preemptive war – without a plan to achieve victory.

-- We already turn away Nazi sympathizers who apply for citizenship. We already refuse to have diplomatic or military relations with Nazi regions. The only practical consequence of a declaration of war would be to make it a crime to give aid and comfort to GGR and other Nazi regions – a goal which could be achieved by a simple amendment to the Criminal Code.

-- The broader NationStates community would inevitably conflate an ideologically based “war” on GGR with the casus belli of other regions at war with GGR, some of whom are at war based on narrow, particularized grievances that are only peripherally connected to contempt for Nazism.

Ultimately, however, my opposition to war is not based on tactical considerations; it is based on what a declaration of war would do to us. Our allies who have declared war on defender organizations are defined to some degree by that conflict. They are not free to ignore an insult from the FRA or UDL; they do not distinguish between defenders who are potentially friendly and those who are implacably hostile; they will not countenance the possibility of open cooperation with defenders on matters of common concern. Of course, being opposed to Nazis is quite a bit different. We are not open to the possibility of “friendly” Nazis coming here as citizens, nor are we willing to contemplate any sort of cooperation with Nazi-themed relations.

But if our distaste for Nazis makes us less leery of closing off avenues for dialogue and cooperation, we should be more leery of the risk Father Rohr describes – the possibility of becoming a mirror image of our enemy. We have long recognized that our raider and imperial allies often get trapped in a raider/defender dynamic that we describe with adjectives such as “tired” and “predictable.” The adjectives used to describe a war with Nazis could be far less flattering – if you believe opposition to evil automatically makes you good, think of Dresden.

As the summer lull rolls in, there will doubtless be concerns about dropping activity levels. I understand how appealing it would be for our leaders to direct our energies toward an external enemy. War would be good for activity in the short run. In the long run, however, it places our core identity and values at risk, just so we can show how much we hate a withered region. We should continue to oppose GGR and other Nazis at every turn, but war is not the answer.

 

[Vinage Vinage]

Very well spoken Skizzy and an excellent piece. Europeia should, and likely will, always stand against Nazi's and those who sympathise with their goals. War should not the be all and end all of any region's stance against these groups and, instead, an international shunning will achieve much the same.

 

[OnderKelkia]

First, from the outset, I do not advocate Europeia declaring war on GGR. We do not not have a specific casus belli and declaring war at this stage might (wrongly) seem more like following than leading, an impression which we should avoid as a world power. Until any specific cause arises, we can continue to unreservedly support our allies against GGR and express our ideologcial opposition to Nazism without a war.

However, this does not mean the concept of war itself is flawed (a point which a substantial part of this article esentially leads to) and beyond that debate, there are further inaccuracies in the above article.

-- The GGR is a weak (but foundered) region, with just 2 nations, that recently had its offsite forum deleted by its service provider. It is not clear that we have the capability to weaken GGR any further. Put another way, it is not clear that a war on GGR would have an achievable objective. It is a mistake to enter any war – especially a preemptive war – without a plan to achieve victory.

First, it is actually 'Greater German Reich' which has 2 nations. On the other hand, 'The Greater German Reich', the region which people are discussing, has 155 nations.

It is true that GGR has been severely weakened recently, but that is largely as a result of the inter-regional war effort triggering causing internal disputes between GGR's military and founder. The repeated declarations of war brought unprecedented inter-regional condemnation onto GGR, causing their membership to question why they were hated on a scale they had never experienced before. Contrary to many claims that the war would have no effect on GGR, this resulted in a substantial proportion of their membership leaving to form a splinter region: this would not have happened at this stage without the wars. Therefore war has been effective in that sense and GGR is much weaker now than it was at the start of the War.

Our allies who have declared war on defender organizations are defined to some degree by that conflict. They are not free to ignore an insult from the FRA or UDL; they do not distinguish between defenders who are potentially friendly and those who are implacably hostile; they will not countenance the possibility of open cooperation with defenders on matters of common concern.

To clarify, to avoid anyone disputing the motives behind my remarks, I am about to discuss the above statements and I discuss them because they are being used as supporting evidence to an argument relating to Europeian policy. This means that the underlying facts need to be tested; I am not attempting to advance TNI-LKE policy. It is clear that this section is essentially an attack on current TNI-LKE war policy (namely TNI's war with the FRA, and The LKE's war with the FRA-UDL), and if that it is going to be used as evidence in a Europeian debate, it needs to be supported.

Where are the 'potentially friendly' defenders you describe? Where are the defenders that do not support violating TNI-LKE sovereignty?

Specifically, on what matters of 'common concern', where meaningful action can feasily be taken, have TNI-LKE actually been blocked from cooperating with UDL-FRA because of the wars? Whenever there has been an issue where they can meaningfully work together on, such as TUKB, TNI-LKE have done so (often with greater willingness than the UDL). However, there's no reason for TNI-LKE tolerate repeated gross violations of sovereignty merely because it will close off meaningless dialogue which will never come to anything.

This issue is also of no practical importance to the Nazi question, because we would never contemplate dialogue with Nazis in the first instance (after all, your argument is that our ideological opposition to Nazism prevents that without a war). You recognise this, but then suggest that declaring war on GGR would somehow 'becoming a mirror image of our enemy.' How does delcaring war on Nazis risk us becoming their mirror image?

We have long recognized that our raider and imperial allies often get trapped in a raider/defender dynamic that we describe with adjectives such as “tired” and “predictable.”

Can we have some examples to support this please? For instance, when have our raider and imperialist allies got trapped in a raider/defender dynamic?

Rather than getting trapped in such a dynamic, they have placed their conflict outside of the raider/defender divide, by refusing to characterise the conflict in military terms (instead seeing it as a war between sovereign regions and organisations), dissenting from the culture of 'Raider Unity' (in many ways more boldly and expressly than our own military, at a point explicitly identifying as raider, did during 2009-10), undertaking an independent imperialist foreign policy and, most recently, taking positive action to attack the GGR in TUKB, prioritising that over squabbling with defenders (in fact supporting defender-authored resolutions even as defenders withdrew and resubmitted them). Simply because they are in a sovereign conflict with the UDL and the FRA does not mean they are creating a raider/defender divide. It is a combination of FRA-UDL propaganda and commentaries such as this which place the conflict within the raider/defender dynamic.

 

[Skizzy Grey]

Thanks for correcting me on GGR vs. The GGR.

To clarify, to avoid anyone disputing the motives behind my remarks, I am about to discuss the above statements and I discuss them because they are being used as supporting evidence to an argument relating to Europeian policy. This means that the underlying facts need to be tested; I am not attempting to advance TNI-LKE policy. It is clear that this section is essentially an attack on current TNI-LKE war policy (namely TNI's war with the FRA, and The LKE's war with the FRA-UDL), and if that it is going to be used as evidence in a Europeian debate, it needs to be supported.

I do not question your motives. I object to your characterization of my point as an "attack," rather than as a criticism, but beyond noting my objection, I'll leave semantics aside and focus on the merits.

Where are the 'potentially friendly' defenders you describe? Where are the defenders that do not support violating TNI-LKE sovereignty?

Specifically, on what matters of 'common concern', where meaningful action can feasily be taken, have TNI-LKE actually been blocked from cooperating with UDL-FRA because of the wars?

Assessing the merits of a road not taken is a speculative endeavor.

I believe Europeia is better off for not having declared war on defender organizations. If we were at war with the FRA and/or the UDL, we would have lost the services of citizens like Lexus, PhDre, Jahka, and Georgie over the years. We would not have had the same diplomatic opening with NPO, which led to a treaty last term. We would be a very different region. and I believe we would be worse off. I suspect most Europeians agree.

You believe TNI and LKE are better off for having declared war. I look at the success Europeia has had in the absence of a declared war and question that belief. Is preserving a sphere of imperial influence worth forgoing the possibility of realizing benefits such as those we in Europeia have enjoyed? Perhaps most citizens of TNI and LKE would answer in the affirmative, and that's their/our* prerogative. In any event, both regions have come to define themselves to some degree by that war -- which was precisely the point I was making in the article about the tendency to define ourselves by reference to our enemies.

Can we have some examples to support this please? For instance, when have our raider and imperialist allies got trapped in a raider/defender dynamic?

We are defining our terms differently. The raider/defender dynamic is a trap created by external perceptions. It's not enough to will oneself to exist outside that dynamic. Hell, Savaer saw himself as existing outside that dynamic -- but no one else (even his allies) did.

Both TNI and Europeia seek to avoid being caught in that dynamic. It is challenging for both of us, because some outsiders define "raider" existentially -- i.e., if one raids, then one is a "raider." I believe Europeia has been more successful than TNI in escaping the R/D dynamic. I believe the lack of a formal, declared war with defender organizations is the single biggest reason for that difference.


*-I'm a citizen of TNI.

 

[Lethen]

Interesting and well-written read, as usual Skizz.

The adjectives used to describe a war with Nazis could be far less flattering – if you believe opposition to evil automatically makes you good, think of Dresden.

Is this a reference to the Dresden fire-bombings during WW2?

 

[Kylia Quilor]

I would assume.

 

[Skizzy Grey]

Interesting and well-written read, as usual Skizz.

The adjectives used to describe a war with Nazis could be far less flattering – if you believe opposition to evil automatically makes you good, think of Dresden.

Is this a reference to the Dresden fire-bombings during WW2?

Yes.

People are willing to do things they would normally never countenance when you convince them they're in a life-or-death struggle with a diabolical enemy. This is the reason Unibot's rhetoric makes me nervous.

 

[Lethen]

People are willing to do things they would normally never countenance when you convince them they're in a life-or-death struggle with a diabolical enemy. This is the reason Unibot's rhetoric makes me nervous.

Welcome to Morals & Issues 101.

 

[OnderKelkia]

Thanks for correcting me on GGR vs. The GGR.

To clarify, to avoid anyone disputing the motives behind my remarks, I am about to discuss the above statements and I discuss them because they are being used as supporting evidence to an argument relating to Europeian policy. This means that the underlying facts need to be tested; I am not attempting to advance TNI-LKE policy. It is clear that this section is essentially an attack on current TNI-LKE war policy (namely TNI's war with the FRA, and The LKE's war with the FRA-UDL), and if that it is going to be used as evidence in a Europeian debate, it needs to be supported.

I do not question your motives. I object to your characterization of my point as an "attack," rather than as a criticism, but beyond noting my objection, I'll leave semantics aside and focus on the merits.

An attack is but a severe criticism; it need not be abusive or especially hostile.

]Where are the 'potentially friendly' defenders you describe? Where are the defenders that do not support violating TNI-LKE sovereignty?

Specifically, on what matters of 'common concern', where meaningful action can feasily be taken, have TNI-LKE actually been blocked from cooperating with UDL-FRA because of the wars?

Assessing the merits of a road not taken is a speculative endeavor.

Yet it is hardly abnormal or incorrect to evaluate the merits of a policy which has not been implemented. Courses of action can and are routinely dismissed based on a proper assessment of incomplete information. In order to undertake meaningful comparisons between different paths, inferences from what evidence is available have to be made.

In the circumstances we are specifically discussing, there are hardly a realm of possibilities. Despite the wars, TNI-LKE have been more than capable of acting in concert with enemy organisations when a practical issue, going beyond in-game divides entirely, such as Nazism or forum destruction arises where meaningful action can be taken. TUKB is the latest example of circumstances where war has not proved to be a constraint.

It is true TNI-LKE would not enter into military, cultural or ordinary diplomatic cooperation with such regions, but there is no tangible benefit whatsoever to be gained from seeking cooperation with regions who reject our sovereignty rather than regions willing to respect our sovereignty: the wars existed because of repeated hostile against TNI-LKE. These are not not questions of 'common concern' because their worldview it is utterly different and rejects the tenets of imperialist foreign policy.

You stated that our allies, a not too subtle reference to TNI-LKE, do not 'not countenance the possibility of open cooperation with defenders on matters of common concern.' That is factual statement. You should be able to evidence that statement in order to allow the evidence to be analysed, however speculatively.

I believe Europeia is better off for not having declared war on defender organizations. If we were at war with the FRA and/or the UDL, we would have lost the services of citizens like Lexus, PhDre, Jahka, and Georgie over the years.

You believe TNI and LKE are better off for having declared war. I look at the success Europeia has had in the absence of a declared war and question that belief. Is preserving a sphere of imperial influence worth forgoing the possibility of realizing benefits such as those we in Europeia have enjoyed?

The palpable benefits we have enjoyed essentially come down solely to increased membership from members of the FRA and the UDL at various points in time. It is true that if TNI and LKE had not enter war, TNI-LKE might also have the privilege of hosting individuals, affiliated to powers which seek to attack our political and military interests, within our ranks.

First, had a more assertive foreign policy been adopted from the outset, some of these individuals would have chosen Europeia over elsewhere, thereby being part of Europeia and also feeling able to support Europeian interests in all in-game circumstances, as expressed by our military operations. For instance, Lexus might have thought twice about rejoining th FRA after resigning from the FRA Assembly over two FRA spies infiltrating his cabinet if Europeia had declared war on the FRA over those incidents. Some of the individuals in the category you mention, like PhDre, were members of Europeia first before UDL-FRA and had they been developed within a war-equvalent atmosphere, likely would not have contemplated the possibility of joining the ranks of the opposition: individuals are a product of their environment.

Second, in modern times (from late 2010 onwards), Europeia has never had a serious membership problem. We have not had a capacity problem. Instead, we have had very significant problems making best use of what we have. As a region of over 1,000 nations, we could potentially have been a NationStates diplomatic superpower from late 2010 onwards, responsible for leading an entire sphere. Instead, that sphere has tended to be TNI-centred, and TNI as a weaker region has inherently not been able to lead it as effectively. We could have used our capacity to great effect by showing leadership rather than neutering our foreign policy.

Largely in order to accomodate members which oppose our military operations, we have remained trapped in viewing the military as raider, distinct from the region. This has deprived the region of what in NatonStates is a very important foreign policy tool due to the military-centred nature of the divide among the significant gameplay UCR powers. If we look at TNI's military to make a comparison, its operations are frequently associated with justifications specific to TNI foreign policy, whereas Europeian operations remain much more likely to be generic raider. Relatively recently, a genuine foreign policy has begun to evolve but much more slowely and much less potentially powerfully than what could have been. More than any other region in NationStates, we have missed that opportunity. In domestic terms, Europeia has exceeded Gatesville. We still don't match their diplomatic influence at their peak.

In short, a region with great domestic strengths has capability to assert greater unequal influence on other regions (which is essentially what imperialism boils down to) by assuming a leadership role against something. That's worth more than moderate increases in domestic strengths in the form of a few additional members: taking into account the factor described above, I do not believe that reduced FRA-UDL membership would have done any significant harm from mid-2010 onwards. No one individual is irreplaceable. Sustainable growth in a region's member capacity comes from recruitment and from inflows of members from likeminded regions; sustainable membership drives do not stem from members unwilling to support every aspect of the region. The military is not just a cultural add-on. It is at the core of foreign policy.

To be clear, I do not advocate Europeia declaring war on the FRA or UDL either. We had an opportunity to do so in 2009, which should have been taken. However, even in late 2010 without a war we could have taken a much more aggressive foreign policy enabling the region to become a genuine world leader. As it is, since the constraint of Earth (an ardent proponent of the kind of raider-military-region-neutral stance I have outlined), a gradual evolution has occurred into a more genuine (albeit not yet a leading) foreign policy, which has been welcome. This could have been much bigger and more rapid.

We would not have had the same diplomatic opening with NPO, which led to a treaty last term.

First, TNI has a treaty with TSP and Lazarus, while The LKE has one with Lazarus: so it should be understood war with the FRA-UDL does not exclude positive feeder/sinker relations. LKE has not been precluded from working with the NPO closely over TUKB.

Second, in the NPO's case, the circumstances are specific because of their Francoist beliefs in relation to TRR. The existence of a war with the FRA or, in modern times, perhaps better directed with the UDL could be conducted while ruling TRR out as a target, though it would be a less effective war militarily.

Finally, if our history was more diplomatically assertive (not just in these negotiations) and our stance on the UDL in particular more rounded, I suspect different treaty terms would have been possible to one excluding the possibility of attack upon TRR, if we had highlighted the implications of TRR's FRA membership in making it a UCR region in all but name and its different purpose to the other GCRs.

Can we have some examples to support this please? For instance, when have our raider and imperialist allies got trapped in a raider/defender dynamic?

We are defining our terms differently. The raider/defender dynamic is a trap created by external perceptions. It's not enough to will oneself to exist outside that dynamic. Hell, Savaer saw himself as existing outside that dynamic -- but no one else (even his allies) did.

Both TNI and Europeia seek to avoid being caught in that dynamic. It is challenging for both of us, because some outsiders define "raider" existentially -- i.e., if one raids, then one is a "raider." I believe Europeia has been more successful than TNI in escaping the R/D dynamic. I believe the lack of a formal, declared war with defender organizations is the single biggest reason for that difference.

That's very interesting, but I missed the examples. In reality, if we are assessing the behaviour of regions rather than external perceptions, Europeia's form of military activity has been more similar to that of a professional raider group than TNI's in many respects. The terms raider-defender are imprecise as geopolitical rather than military descriptors. It is true the portrayal of raiding and defending creates a spectrum within the game, but taking a stance on that spectrum is what creates a meaningful foreign policy.

As it is, you have provided a new conceptual defnition. In which case, have you any examples of the 'external perceptions' trap in operation, to substantiate its existence and allow its significance to be assessed?